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In telling the fascinating story of 
DesRon 21 and its crew, Wukovits 
demonstrates without a doubt that, as 
a scholar and historian, he rivals such 
naval historians of the Pacific theater 
as James Hornfischer and Samuel 
Eliot Morison� The book might have 
included more maps to ensure correct 
and continued orientation to the 
events, places, movements, and battles 
it describes� Nonetheless, Wukovits has 
compiled an excellent study of DesRon 
21, one that is demonstrably the product 
of lengthy research into wartime naval 
records; academic research; and personal 
oral interviews with those DesRon 21 
crewmembers still living, which bring 
an intimate and personal quality to 
this historical study� In sum, Tin Can 
Titans unquestionably is a must-have 
addition for any armchair World War II 
history buff or student of naval history�
BLAKE I� CAMPBELL
The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent, by Matthew Jones� Vol� 1, From the V-
Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964. 
London: Routledge, 2017� 547 pages� $155�
The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent, by Matthew Jones� Vol� 2, The Labour 
Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964–
1970. London: Routledge, 2017� 559 pages� $155�
No inquiry into British nuclear his-
tory can be undertaken in isolation 
from the presence of an intimate U�S� 
involvement� It therefore is worth 
taking notice of the publication of the 
two-volume Official History of the UK 
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent� Matthew 
Jones, professor of international history 
at the London School of Economics, 
was granted unprecedented access 
to hitherto unavailable materials 
to produce this official history�
At the beginning of both volumes, 
Professor Jones graciously pays tribute to 
the pioneers of British nuclear historiog-
raphy, Professor Margaret Gowing and 
her associate Lorna Arnold� Gowing, 
official historian of the United Kingdom 
(U�K�) Atomic Energy Authority and 
professor of the history of science at 
Oxford, authored the studies that set the 
scholarly standard: Britain and Atomic 
Energy, 1939–1945 and, a decade later, 
her two-volume Independence and 
Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 
1945–1952. Arnold assisted Gowing, 
then in 2001 published her own book, 
Britain and the H-bomb. Jones’s two 
new volumes are worthy sequels�
America’s initial monopoly over the 
atomic bomb fed the British sense of 
technological exclusion� Determined 
then to “go it alone,” Britain asserted an 
initial nuclear doctrine of sovereign and 
independent control over its nuclear 
weapons� It was only after Britain had 
demonstrated a unilateral mastery of 
thermonuclear weapons development 
in May 1957 that the United Kingdom 
was granted access to specific U�S� 
nuclear weapons technologies� For 
Jones, the ensuing 1958 U�S�-U�K� 
mutual-defense agreement remains 
“one of the most remarkable examples 
of pooling of sensitive national security 
information by two sovereign states, 
and has rightly been seen as one of the 
fundamental pillars of the post-war 
Anglo-American relationship�”
The United Kingdom’s capacity to 
inflict assured nuclear destruction, 
independent of the United States, 
allowed it to behave as a “second centre 
of decision�” In this position, Britain 
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secured the ability not only to “leverage” 
the United States politically but also 
to command a seat at the geostrategic 
“top table�” Jones presents the Skybolt 
missile crisis of 1962 as an example of 
this nuclear-based political leverage over 
the United States� Aiming at updating 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the United 
States promised delivery of the Skybolt 
system� A nuclear, standoff, air-to-
ground missile, Skybolt was designed to 
penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of 
an increasing Soviet antiballistic-missile 
(ABM) capability� When President 
Kennedy abruptly canceled the agree-
ment in November 1962, he did so 
ostensibly on technical grounds� In truth, 
the United States opposed, on political 
grounds, any extension to the life of the 
U�K� nuclear deterrent� Seeing through 
this ruse, Prime Minister Macmillan 
was instrumental in resolving the crisis 
at the Nassau conference in December 
1962—by hoisting Kennedy’s policy 
on its own petard� The United States 
was forced to concede the nature of 
its opposition to sharing Skybolt, and 
instead to offer a replacement—which 
paradoxically became Britain’s second-
generation nuclear deterrent: the Polaris 
missile system� Not only had Britain’s 
first-generation deterrent not been 
curbed, but the United States in fact had 
become father to a second generation�
Volume 2 brings with it the advent of 
a new ministry in 1964, led by Harold 
Wilson and the Labour Party� The 
necessity for a Polaris Improvement 
Program takes center stage in this 
volume, since the Polaris A-3 missile 
was becoming obsolescent, just as the 
second-generation Polaris system was 
coming on line� There is a fascinating 
portrayal of the Whitehall bureaucracy 
at work in the constant race to maintain 
a semblance of qualitative nuclear 
parity with the United States�
In the wake of the U�S� shift to the 
Poseidon’s advanced technology of 
the multiple independently targetable 
reentry vehicle (MIRV), Britain under 
Wilson’s aegis set off alone to begin 
exploitation of an intermediate technol-
ogy, Antelope, that the United States had 
developed but later abandoned in favor 
of MIRVs� The climax of the U�K� Polaris 
Improvement Program was reached with 
Chevaline, a unique configurational 
change to alter the front end of the 
Polaris missile, thereby rendering it 
all but invulnerable to interception by 
deployed Soviet ABMs� But the history 
of that program will have to await the 
projected third volume in this series�
Meantime, Professor Jones has 
written an excellent description of 
Britain’s quest for a sovereign and 
independent strategic nuclear deterrent� 
Completely mastering his sources, 
Jones has produced a compelling work 
of lasting significance� He has come 
full circle, following in the footsteps 
of his larger-than-life role models, 
Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold�
MYRON A� GREENBERG
Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a 
Complex World, by Stanley McChrystal, with 
Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris 
Fussell� New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015� 290 
pages� $29�95�
During the years he spent hunting 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and battling 
the forces of Al Qaeda in the streets 
and deserts of Iraq, General Stanley 
McChrystal turned the Joint Special 
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